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REFLECTIONS ON THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL
SEGREGATION IN HOUSING
ALAN

I.

C. WEINSTEIN•

INTRODUCTION

My reflection on Professor Roberts' Sullivan Lecture poses two
questions. First, how far have we come as a nation from the hyper
segregated housing patterns of the 1930s through 1960s that Professor
Roberts described in her lecture? Regrettably, the answer appears to be not
far at all. Further, we are today faced with a second form of hyper
segregation, one based on income rather than race. 1 Second, why have we
made so little progress to date in addressing housing segregation? The
simple answer here, of course, is that efforts to address the situation
Professor Roberts describes have proved inadequate.2 But why? While a
comprehensive answer to that question is well beyond the scope of this
writing, the author examines why one of the efforts has proven inadequate:
the attempts to combat "exclusionary zoning." 3

II.

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION THEN AND

Now

Professor Roberts' article notes that, using one common measure of
racial segregation, the "isolation index," which measures the extent to
which blacks live in neighborhoods that are predominantly black, "[t]he
spatial isolation of African-Americans in Chicago 'increased from only
Copyright© 2016, Alan C. Weinstein.
•Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law/Professor of Urban Studies,
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University.
1
See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Growth in the Residential Segregation
of Families by Income, 1970-2009, US2010 PROJECT (Nov. 2011), https://
s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/reportl 11111.pdf [https://perma.ccff4RG
XW4F] (concluding that segregation of families by income has grown significantly in the
last 40 years); Paul A. Jargowsky, The Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, the
Concentration ofPoverty, and Public Policy, CENTURY FOUND. 1 (Aug. 9, 2015), https://s3
us-west-2.amazonaws.com/production.tcf.org/app/uploads/2015/08/07182514/Jargowsky_
ArchitectureofSegregation-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSX2-V7LG] (finding "a dramatic
increase in the number of high-poverty neighborhoods" and showing that the "number of
people living in high-poverty ghettos, barrios, and slums has nearly doubled since 2000,
rising from 7.2 million to 13.8 million").
2
See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 1, at abstract.
3
See infra Part IV.
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10% in 1900 to 70% thirty years later. "'4 The situation Professor Roberts
describes has changed little over the ensuing decades. Based on data from
the US2010 Project, the spatial isolation of African-Americans in Chicago
had increased to 89.9% by 1980. 5 While the isolation index for African
Americans had declined to 79.9% by 2010,6 that figure still represents a
relative increase in isolation for African-Americans of over 14% when
compared to the 1930 figure noted by Professor Roberts. 7
Another commonly used measure of segregation in housing is the
dissimilarity index. 8 As explained by the US2010 Project:
The dissimilarity index measures whether one particular
group is distributed across census tracts in the
metropolitan area in the same way as another group. A
high value indicates that the two groups tend to live in
different tracts. D[issimilarity] ranges from 0 to 100. A
value of 60 (or above) is considered very high. It means
that 60% (or more) of the members of one group would
need to move to a different tract in order for the two
groups to be equally distributed. Values of 40 or 50 are
usually considered a moderate level of segregation, and
values of 30 or below are considered to be fairly low. 9

4
Dorothy E. Roberts, Crossing Two Color Lines: Interracial Marriage and Residential
Segregation in Chicago, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2017) (citing DOUGLASS. MASSEY &
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE

UNDERCLASS 24 (1993)). The isolation index is the percentage of same-group population in
the census tract where the average member of a racial/ethnic group lives. DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS 23 (1993). It has a lower bound of zero (for a very small group that is
quite dispersed) to 100 (meaning that group members are entirely isolated from other
groups). See id. Thus, the index measures "the extent to which minority members are
exposed only to one another ...." Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, The Dimensions
of Residential Segregation, 67 Soc. FORCES 281, 288 (1988); Margery Austin Turner &
Judson James, Discrimination as an Object of Measurement, 17 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEV.
& REs. 3, 3 (2015) (describing how discrimination in housing is measured). Note, however,
that this index is "affected by the size of the group-it is almost inevitably smaller for
smaller groups, and it is likely to rise over time if the group becomes larger." Residential
Segregation, DIVERSITY & DISPARITIES, https://s4.ad.brown.edu/projects/diversity/
segregation201 O/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/SK8X-D9Q B].
5
Chicago City, DIVERSITY & DISPARITIES, https://s4.ad.brown.edu/projects/diversity/
segregation201O/city.aspx?cityid=1714000 [https://perma.cc/LK46-3DSR].
6 Jd.
7
See Roberts, supra note 4, at 10-11.
8
See Chicago City, supra note 5.
9 Id.
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Data from Chicago for the dissimilarity index for African-Americans
mirrors that for the isolation index; in 1980, the dissimilarity index for
African-Americans ranged from 90.8% to 88.8%, depending on the racial
group comparator 10 and the index declined to between 83.1% and 80.8%
by 2010. 11 In comparison, the dissimilarity indices for the non-African
American racial groups-Asians, Hispanics, and Whites-were
significantly lower, ranging from a high of 67.3% for Asian-Hispanics in
1980 to a low of 40.8% for Asian-Whites in 2010. 12
The pattern of racial segregation seen in Chicago is not unique. 13
When researchers William H. Frey and Dowell Myers examined data from
the 2000 Census, 14 they found that 143 of 318 Metropolitan Areas
(44.97%) had Black-White dissimilarity indices of at least 60%, meaning
that they fell into the "very high" category .15 Further, only 80 of the 318
(25.16%) had Black-White dissimilarity indices of 50% or below, meaning
that they had low to moderate dissimilarity. 16 Perhaps most notably, none
of the 318 had a dissimilarity index in the "fairly low" category of 30% or
below. 17

10
The 1980 dissimilarity index was 90.8% between African-Americans and Asians,
90.6% between African-Americans and Whites, and 88.8% between African-Americans and
Hispanics. Id.
11
The 2010 dissimilarity index was 83.1% between African-Americans and Asians,
82.5% between African-Americans and Whites, and 80.8% between African-Americans and
Hispanics. Id.
12
The only dissimilarity index that showed significant improvement between 1980 and
2010 was White-Asian, declining from 51.4% to 40.8%, a relative decline ofjust over 20%.
Id. The other indices barely changed during the same period: White-Hispanic went from
61.4% to 60.9% and Asian-Hispanic from 67.3% to 66.6%. Id.
13
See Camille Zubrinsky 9harles, The Dynamics ofRacial Residential Segregation, 29
ANN.
REv.
Soc.
167
(2003),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/30036965.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DFV-PUL3] (providing a comprehensive review of the dynamics and
consequences of racial residential segregation).
14
Frey and Myers issued a report that accompanied the release of detailed racial
segregation indices for the 318 U.S. metropolitan areas by CensusScope. William H. Frey
& Dowell Myers, Neighborhood Segregation in Single-Race and Multirace America: A
Census 2000 Study of Cities and Metropolitan Areas 1 (Fannie Mae Found., Working
Paper, 2002), http://www.censusscope.org/FreyWPFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6ML
8PPE]; United States Segregation: Dissimilarity Indices, CENSUSSCOPE (2000) [hereinafter
CENSUSSCOPE], http://www.censusscope.org/us/print_rank_dissimilarity_white_black.html
[https://perma.cc/86M7-V5BB].
15
See CENSUSSCOPE, supra note 14.
16
See id.
17
See id. Note, however, that because a number of the smaller metropolitan areas have
a small African-American population, CensusScope cautions: "When a group's population
is small, its dissimilarity index may be high even if the group's members are evenly
(continued)
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Compounding these long-standing patterns of racial segregation is the
more recent growth in spatial segregation by income. 18 Sean Reardon and
Kendra Bischoff report:
As overall income inequality grew in the last four decades,
high- and low-income families have become increasingly
less likely to live near one another. Mixed income
neighborhoods have grown rarer, while affluent and poor
neighborhoods have grown much more common. Jn fact,
the share of the population in large and moderate-sized
metropolitan areas who live in the poorest and most
affluent neighborhoods has more than doubled since 1970,
while the share of families living in middle-income
neighborhoods dropped from 65 percent to 44 percent.
The residential isolation of the both poor and affluent
families has grown over the last four decades, though
affluent families have been generally more residentially
isolated than poor families during this period. Income
segregation among African Americans and Hispanics grew
more rapidly than among non-Hispanic whites, especially
since 2000. These trends are consequential because people
are affected by the character of the local areas in which
they live. The increasing concentration of income and
wealth (and therefore of resources such as schools, parks,
and public services) in a small number of neighborhoods
results in greater disadvantages for the remaining neighbor
hoods where low- and middle-income families live. 19
Their finding that "[i]ncome segregation among African Americans
and Hispanics grew more rapidly than among non-Hispanic whites,
especially since 2000," 20 is confirmed by Paul Jargowsky's research
finding similar pattems. 21
These findings would seem to suggest that were income inequality
trends to reverse, and thus narrow the gap between White and Black
distributed throughout the area. Thus, when a group's population is less than 1,000,
exercise caution in interpreting its dissimilarity indices." Id.
18
See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 1, at abstract
19 Id.
20
Id.
21
Jargowsky, supra note I, at 1. See also David Albouy & Mike Zabek, Housing
Inequality 1 (Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21916, 2016),
http://davidalbouy.net/housinginequality.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A4Q-KCBD]
(finding
increasing "compression" of housing inequality in recent years).

2017]

RACIAL SEGREGATION IN HOUSING

63

incomes, that associated racial segregation might abate to some degree.
But a recently published New York Times analysis of 2014 census data
concludes that even if that were to occur, patterns of racial segregation in
housing would largely be unaffected. 22 The Times reports:
Affluent black families, freed from the restrictions of low
income, often end up living in poor and segregated
commumttes anyway.
It is a national phenomenon
challenging the popular assumption that segregation is
more about class than about race, that when black families
earn more money, some ideal of post-racial integration
will inevitably be reached. In fact, a New York Times
analysis of 2014 census figures shows that income alone
cannot explain, nor would it likely end, the segregation
that has defined American cities and suburbs for
generations. The choices that black families make today
are inevitably constrained by a legacy of racism that
prevented their ancestors from buying quality housing and
then passing down wealth that might have allowed today's
generation to move into more stable communities. And
even when black households try to cross color boundaries,
they are not always met with open arms: Studies have
shown that white people prefer to live in communities
where there are fewer black people, regardless of their
income. The result: Nationally, black and white families
23
of similar incomes still live in separate worlds.
This reflection could cite numerous additional sources documenting
24
the persistence of racial segregation in housing up to the present. Rather
22
John Eligon & Robert Gebeloff, Affluent and Black, and Still Trapped by
Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/
milwaukee-segregation-wealthy-black-fam ilies. html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/74NM-WSN 7).
23
24

Id.

See, e.g., The Future of Fair Housing, NAT'L COMMISSION FAIR HOUSING & EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY I (Dec. 2008), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/fairhousing/
future_of_fair_ housing_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAS8-8JAJ] (noting the Commission's
hearings "exposed the fact that despite strong legislation, past and ongoing discriminatory
practices in the nation's housing and lending markets continue to produce [extreme] levels
of residential segregation that result in significant disparities between minority and non
minority households ...."). See also Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice
Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 967, 967 (2012) (arguing there has been a persistent failure to
deliver real housing choice and opportunity to communities of color in housing markets
across the United States); Mireya Navarro, Segregation Is an Obstacle to New York's
Housing Push, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/images/2016/04/15/
(continued)
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than belabor that point, however, this reflection now turns to the next
question: why have we made so little progress to date in addressing
housing segregation?

Ill. WHY HAS SEGREGATION PERSISTED?
There is little debate on the answer to that question: a combination of
public and private policies over the decades have perpetuated our racial
segregation in housing. 25 For example, a recent report from the National
Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 26 concludes:
The continuing levels of racial and economic segregation
in America's metropolitan areas result from a long history
of public and private discriminatory actions. Segregation
is rooted in historical practices but is maintained and
sometimes worsened by continued discriminatory
practices, including: present-day discrimination and
steering in the private rental, sales, lending, and insurance
markets; exclusionary zoning, land use, and school
nytfrontpage/scan.pdf [https://penna.cc/6Q7X-K43D] (describing the persistence of
residential racial segregation in New York).
25
See, e.g., FAlR Hous. COMM'N, http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/
National%20Commission/National%20Commission%200utline.pdf [https://penna.cc/826X
-GW44].
26
In 2008, the 40th Anniversary of the Fair Housing Act, several civil rights groups
agreed that the anniversary provided an excellent opportunity for the civil rights community
to take stock of the status of fair housing in this country and look toward the future of fair
housing practices. Id. Accordingly, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education
Fund (LCCREF), Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCRUL) and the
National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) created a Fair Housing Commission which
conducted regional hearings across the country to "gather testimony, research, data and
information on fair housing enforcement and the persistence of residential segregation forty
years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act." Id. The hearings, chaired by former HUD
Secretaries Jack Kemp and Henry Cisneros, explored a number of issues: (i) the persistence
of discrimination and segregation; (ii) the impact of segregation on our communities and on
education, and the benefit~ of integrated neighborhoods; (iii) federal fair housing
enforcement mechanisms; (iv) enforcement by state and local governments and in the
private sector, including individuals and neighborhood organizations and private, non-profit
fair housing centers; (v) strategies to break down residential segregation and provide
households isolated in segregated areas the opportunity to find integrative alternatives; and
(vi) the shortage of affordable housing and strategies to increase the stock of affordable
housing. Id. Hearings were held in Chicago on July 15; Houston on July 31; Los Angeles
on September 9; Boston on September 22; and Atlanta on October 17. The Future ofFair
Housing, NAT'L FAIR HOUSlNG ALLEGlANCE, http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/
nationalcommission/tabid/2963/default.aspx [https://penna.cc/3KVY-LFY8]. Ultimately,
the hearings concluded with the release of a report put out by the sponsoring organizations
on December 9. Id.
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policies at the state and local governmental level;
continuing government policies affecting the location of
subsidized housing; the limited choices provided to those
who receive federal housing assistance; income and wealth
differences; and bank and insurance disinvestment in
minority neighborhoods. 27
That conclusion is supported by other sources. For example, a recent story
in the New York Times discussed the findings of a report issued by the
National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 28 which found that race was
an important factor in deciding whether banks lend for mortgages in
certain neighborhoods. 29
Specifically, the report indicated that banks made fewer
loans to middle- and lower-income borrowers in minority
neighborhoods than to borrowers with similar incomes in
white neighborhoods .... Last year, the group did a similar
analysis of lending in Baltimore, concluding that the racial
27

The Future ofFair Housing, supra note 24. See also Myron Orfield, Land Use and
Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 877, 877 (2006); Rachel L. Swams, Biased Lending Evolves, and Blacks Face
Trouble Getting Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
1013 1/nyregion/hudson-city-bank-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/PSB9-2N 65] (reporting
that in 2014 Hudson City Savings Bank approved 1,886 mortgages in an area that included
New Jersey and sections of New York and Connecticut. However, only twenty-five of
those loans went to black borrowers, resulting in Hudson-while denying wrongdoing
agreeing to pay nearly $33 million to settle a lawsuit brought by the federal Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice).
28
The website for the Coalition describes the organization as:
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) was formed
in 1990 by national, regional, and local organizations to develop and
harness the collective energies of community reinvestment
organizations from across the country so as to increase the flow of
private capital into traditionally underserved communities. NCRC has
grown to an association of more than 600 community-based
organizations that promote access to basic banking services, including
credit and savings, to create and sustain affordable housing, job
development and vibrant communities for America's working families.
About Us, NAT'L COMMUNITY REfNVESTMENT COALITION, http://www.ncrc.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/R5KM-3HK2].
29
Peter Eavis, Race Strongly Influences Mortgage Lending in St. Louis, Study Finds,
N.Y. TrMES (July 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07 /19/business/dealbook/race
strongly-influences-mortgage-lending-in-st-louis-study-finds.html [https://perma.cc/GAX7
BECV].
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composition of an area often drove where banks made
mortgages. 30
Another example can be seen in the persistence of "racial steering" as a
significant factor in perpetuating racial segregation in housing. 31 The most
recent national study of housing discrimination by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development reported very high levels
of discrimination and steering against Black, Latino, Asian, and Native
American home seekers based on the experience of paired testers
(investigators posing as renters or homebuyers) in major metropolitan
housing markets. 32 In the same vein is a scholarly article reporting on the
persistence of racial steering by real estate professionals. 33 Other scholars
have examined how government housing polices perpetuate racial
.
34
segregat10n.
A comprehensive analysis of each of these factors is well beyond the
scope of this writing. Rather, below this reflection more closely examines
one of the efforts that has proved inadequate: the various attempts to
combat exclusionary zoning.

IV. MIXED RESULTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
Scholars and practitioners have long recognized that many newer
suburbs, particularly those in the highly urbanized Northeast, engage in so
called "exclusionary zoning" by using their land-use regulations to
30

Id.

31

Rachel Blake, Commentary, Illegal Steering in America: Who's at the Wheel?, 16 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 95, 95 (2007) (reporting a 2006 study of
twelve major metropolitan areas in the United States finding that steering occurred in at
least 87% of the studied interactions).
32
Margery Austin Turner et al., Housing Discrimination Against Racial and Ethnic
Minorities 2012, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING & URBAN DEV. xi (June 2013), http://
www.huduser.gov/portal/Publications/pdf/HUD-514_HDS2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF77
-AZXJ].
Although the most blatant forms of housing discrimination (refusing to
meet with a minority homeseeker or provide information about any
available units) have declined since the first national .Paired-testing
study in 1977, the forms of discrimination that persist (providing
information about fewer units) raise the costs of housing search for
minorities and restrict their housing options.
Id.
33

See generally Blake, supra note 31.
See, e.g., Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial
Segregation: Lessons from Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 662
(2011); Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination
and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 How. L.J. 913, 913 (2005).
34
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frustrate the development of low- and moderate-income housing and
encourage low-density, high-cost development. 35 The most common
exclusionary zoning practices include: large mm1mum lot size
requirements; 36 restrictions on multi-family housing; 37 prohibition of
manufactured housing and mobile homes; 38 imposition of fees, exactions
and costly amenities on new developments; 39 and limitations on annual
growth. 40
In the 1970s, affordable housing advocates and developers seeking to
build such housing began challenging exclusionary zoning practices in the
courts and, by 1975, their challenges appeared to have met with
remarkable success. 41 In its landmark opinion in Southern Burlington
County, NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that exclusionary zoning violated equal
protection and substantive due process guarantees in the state constitution,
and ruled that New Jersey municipalities had to meet their "fair share" o(
the "regional need" for low- and moderate-income housing. 42 That same
year, the highest courts in two neighboring states, New York43 and
Pennsylvania,44 also ruled that municipalities had to consider the effect of
their zoning regulations on regional housing needs. These victories proved
35
See, e.g., Norman Williams, Jr. & Thomas Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls.'
The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475, 475 (1971); Richard F.
Babcock & Fred P. Bosselman, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND
HOUSING IN THE 1970s 1-3 (1973).
36
See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing
Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 309 (2002).
37
See, e.g., Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 10 (2001 ).
38
See Schuck, supra note 36, at 309.
39
See Span, supra note 37, at 10.
40
See, e.g., JOHN M. DEGROVE, THE NEW FRONTIER FOR LAND POLICY: PLANNING AND
GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES 1 (1992). But see Note, State-Sponsored Growth
Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1995)
(arguing that state growth management programs can be used to combat local exclusionary
zoning).
41
See James C. Quinn, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent Federal
and State Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147, 148-49 (1975).
42
336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975).
43
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241-43 (N.Y. 1975). In
Berenson, the N.Y. Court of Appeals announced a two-part test for municipal zoning
ordinances challenged as being exclusionary. Id. at 241-42. The ordinance should: (1)
provide for a "balanced [and] cohesive community" and (2) take into consideration
regional, as well as local, housing needs. Id. But the court qualified the latter requirement
by holding that a municipality need not meet a "fair share" standard unless the regional
need for low and moderate-income housing is not being met elsewhere. Id. at 242-43.
44
Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, lnc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975).

68

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

145:59

fleeting, however, as subsequent court decisions in all three states soon
limited the impact of the "regional fair share" need requirement. 45
While neither the New York nor the Pennsylvania courts after 1975
have imposed an effective "fair share" housing obligation on local
governments, the situation is different in New Jersey. 46 There, by 1983, it
had become clear that the exclusion of developed and rural areas from the
requirement that they meet a "fair share" obligation, 47 combined with the
"numberless" approach to "fair share" issues authorized by the Supreme
Court's 1977 Oakwood at Madison ruling, 48 made Mount Laurel I a paper

45
See New Jersey: Oakwood at Madison Inc., v. Twp. of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192,
1200 (N .J. 1977) (holding that trial courts were not required to calculate "the precise fair
share of the lower income housing needs of a specifically demarcated region."); Fobe
Assocs. v. Mayor and Council of Demarest, 379 A.2d 31, 34 (N.J. 1977) and Pascack Ass'n
Ltd. v. Mayor and Council of Wash. Twp., 379 A.2d 6, 13 (N.J. 1977) (each holding that
"fair share" requirements need not be applied to "developed" municipalities); Glenview
Dev. Co. v. Franklin Twp., 397 A.2d 384, 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (declining to
apply "fair share" requirements to rural areas not undergoing development). New York:
Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Inc. Viii. of Upper Brookville, 414 N.E.2d 680, 683-84 (N.Y.
I 980) (upholding a five-acre minimum lot requirement, ruling that the Berenson
requirements were not violated unless there was proof of an exclusionary purpose or the
ordinance ignored regional housing needs and had an exclusionary effect); Suffolk Hous.
Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 51 I N.E.2d 67, 67-70 (N.Y. 1987) (rejecting a claim that
zoning restrictions and allegedly cumbersome procedures had prevented development of
low-income housing in a suburban Long Island town. The ruling held that the plaintiffs had
not stated a cause of action, in part, because they had not presented the town with a request
to develop a particular parcel for low-income housing); Suffolk Interreligious Coal. on
Hous. v. Town of Brookhaven, 575 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549-50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(declining to review a decision rejecting the claims of a group challenging the Brookhaven
ordinance who met the "particular parcel" requirement referred to in Suffolk Hous. Servs. );
Asian Ams. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265, 273 (N.Y. 1988) (rejecting an
exclusionary zoning challenge to the density bonus provisions in New York City's
Chinatown Special District zoning regulations based on claim that the bonus, while
intended to promote lower-income housing, was being used for much more expensive
developments); see generally John R. Nolon, A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey's
Mount Laurel Cases with the Berenson Cases in New York, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3
(1986). Pennsylvania: Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence Twp., 382 A.2d
105, 109-10 (Pa. 1977) (reducing "fair share" concept to a non-binding "general precept");
BAC, Inc. v. Millcreek Twp., 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993) (holding that only restrictions
on types of housing, not classes of people, were unlawful); Katrin C. Rowan, Comment,
Anti-Exclusionary Zoning in Pennsylvania: A Weapon for Developers, a Loss for Low
Income Pennsylvanians, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2007). See generally Clayton H.
Collins, Comment, Affordable Housing Options Under Pennsylvania's Three Legislative
Regimes, 28 J.L. & COM. 247 (2010).
46
See No Ion, supra note 45, at 3-7.
47
See Fobe, 379 A.2d at 34; Pascack, 379 A.2d at 13; Glenview, 397 A.2d at 391.
48
Oakwood, 371 A.2d at 1200, 1216--23.
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tiger. 49 In an effort to revitalize its Mount Laurel "doctrine," the New
Jersey Supreme Court consolidated an appeal from Mount Laurel
Township with five other "fair share" cases and issued a mammoth opinion
that revolutionized land-use regulation in New Jersey .so
Mount Laurel II specified an array of substantive and procedural
policies to ensure that its mandate for the creation of low and moderate
income housing would be fulfilled.s 1 Most critically, the court imposed the
requirement that a "fair share" burden be calculated for all communities
designated as "growth areas" in a 1980 state development plan, ruled that
three judges-each responsible for a different part of the state-be
appointed to hear and expedite all Mount Laurel "fair share" litigation, and
empowered these judges to authorize a "builder's remedy" to allow for the
construction of low-income housing in communities that fail to meet their
"fair share" obligation.s 2 Mount Laurel II also challenged the New Jersey,
legislature to address the "fair share" issue. s3 In 1985, the legislatur~
responded, enacting a Fair Housing Acts 4 that replaced court supervision of
municipal "fair share" obligations with an administrative agency, the
Council on Affordable Housing. ss The Act provided that a municipality

49

See, e.g., Henry L. Kent-Smith, Note, The Council on Affordable Housing and the
Mount Laurel Doctrine: Will the Council Succeed?, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 933 (1987)
(arguing that Mount Laurel I failed to produce low cost housing); Paula A. Franzese, Mount
Laurel Ill: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REv. 30,
32 (1988) (arguing that little had changed in the eight years between Mount Laurel I and
Mount Laurel 11); Alan Mallach, From Mount Laurel to Molehill: Blueprint for Delay, 15
N.J. REP., Oct. 1985, at 21 (noting that eight years after Mount Laurel I no affordable
housing had yet been built in Mount Laurel Township).
50
S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel JI), 456 A.2d
390, 410 (N.J. 1983).
51
Id. at418-21.
52
Id. at 420. See also Alan Mallach, The Tortured Reality of Suburban F.xclusion:
Zoning, Economics and the Future of the Berenson Decision, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 37,
119 (1986) (noting that over 100 lawsuits were filed by builders against New Jersey
municipalities between 1983 and 1986).
53
S. Burlington, 456 A.2d at 417.
54
New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270-301-329.9 (West
2008). See also Franzese, supra note 49, at 36--40 (discussing the Act).
55
The Council on Affordable Housing (COAR) is an agency of the Government of
New Jersey within the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs that is responsible for
ensuring that all 566 New Jersey municipalities provided their fair share of low and
moderate income housing. The COAR is made up of 12 members appointed by the
Governor of New Jersey and approved by the New Jersey Senate. N.J. STAT.
ANN.§ 52:27D-305 (West 2008). COAH defines housing regions, estimated the needs for
low/moderate income housing, allocates fair share numbers by municipality and reviews
plans to fulfill these obligations. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-302, -304 (West 2008). See
(continued)
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that failed to participate in the Council's administrative process for
substantive certification of a "fair share" plan would be subject to the full
range of remedies previously available through Mount Laurel litigation. 56
One year later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the Act against a
facial challenge, a decision commonly referred to as Mount Laurel III. 57
The most controversial section of the Act was its provision for
"Regional Contribution Agreements" (RCAs) that allowed suburban
municipalities to compensate urban municipalities which agreed to accept
up to 50% of the suburb's "fair share" housing obligation. 58 The "sending"
municipality paid a negotiated fee for each unit transferred. 59 Critics
claimed that RCAs violated the integrationist imperative of the Mount
Laurel decisions by perpetuating a significant degree of racial and
economic segregation while supporters of the concept argued that it has
provided a desperately needed infusion of dollars for housing in the state's
poorest cities, while still advancing integration in the suburbs. 60 RCAs
were later abolished as part of a major legislative revision of the Fair
Housing Act in 2008. 61
By 2010, COAH's troubles were mounting. ln 2007, the rules it had
adopted to implement a new methodology for determining municipal fair

also Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties ofSocial Policy in a
Time ofRetrenchment, 63 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 849, 850 (2011) (describing the COAH).
56
See generally New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270
301-329.9 (West 2008).
57
Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards in the Cty. of Somerset (Mount Laurel III), 510
A.2d 621, 634 (N.J. 1986).
58
New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 52:270-312 (West 2008).
59
For example, Marlboro Township signed an agreement in June 2008 providing that
the city of Trenton would build or rehabilitate 332 housing units (out of Marlboro's 1,600
unit obligation), with Marlboro paying $25,000 per unit for a total of $8.3 million, to
Trenton for taking on the responsibility for these units. Marlboro Will Pay Trenton to Take
Affordable Housing, GMNEWS ARCHIVE (June 18, 2008), http://wwwl.gmnews.com/
. 2008/06/18/marlboro-wil 1-pay-trenton-to-take-affordable-housing/ [https://penna.cc/8D Y9
EGPM].
6
Compare Rachel Fox, The Selling Out of Mount Laurel: Regional Contribution
Agreements in New Jersey's Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 535, 537, 565-72
(1988) (criticizing RCAs), with Alan Mallach, supra note 55, at 854 (arguing that "from a
pragmatic standpoint, RCAs provided an important safety valve for suburban
municipalities, mitigating at least some of their opposition to Mount Laurel, while offering
a relatively easy way for urban municipalities to obtain funds for politically attractive
housing activities").
61
Act of July 17, 2008, 2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 46 (codified as amended at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:270-329.6 (West 2008)).
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housing obligations62 were overturned in a lawsuit brought by housing
advocates 63 and the COAH's revised rules were again invalidated in
2010. 64 In January 2011, the New Jersey legislature passed legislation that
would have abolished COAR, which Governor Chris Christie conditionally
vetoed due to his disagreement with the fair housing obligations the
legislation would have imposed on municipalities. 65 Rather than amend
the legislation to satisfy Governor Christie's objections, the chief sponsor,
Senator Raymond Lesniak, withdrew the bill on February 7, 2011, and the
legislature took no further action. 66 Governor Christie subsequently
abolished the COAR through a reorganization plan and transferred its
functions to the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs. But that
unilateral action was later invalidated on the ground that it exceeded the
Governor's powers as regards to the COAR under the Fair Housing Act. 67
In October 2014, COAH deadlocked on adopting new substantive rules
establishing fair housing requirements for municipalities, thus failing to
meet the state supreme court's deadline for adopting rules to replace those
the court had previously struck down. 68 In March 2015, in a case that has
become known as Mount Laurel IV, the court returned the responsibility
for overseeing compliance with the Fair Housing Act to the courts,
designating fifteen superior court judges to arbitrate claims brought under
the Act. 69 These so-called "Mount Laurel IV cases" are just now
proceeding through the courts and so it is premature to render any
62

See, e.g., John M. Payne, The Paradox of Progress: Three Decades of the Mount
Laurel Doctrine, 5 J. PLAN. HIST. 126, 131 (2006) (describing context for the change in
methodology).
63
In re Adoption ofN.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 914
A.2d 348, 400-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (finding that the COAH methodology
was incomprehensible).
64
In re Adoption ofN.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 74
A.3d 893, 896 (N.J. 2013), ajf'g 6 A.3d 445 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
65
Press Release, Office of Governor Chris Christie, Governor Chris Christie Calls
Current COAH Legislation Insufficient (Jan. 24, 2011), http://nj.gov/governor/news/
news/55201 l/approved/20110124b.html [https://perma.cc/A9YS-XLCF). See Stuart Meck,
Commentary, New Jersey's Mount Laurel Doctrine and Its Implementation: Under Attack,
But Safe (for Now), 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Jan. 2014, at4, 7 (discussing Governor Christie's
various objections).
66
Meck, supra note 65, at 7.
67
In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council of Affordable Hous., 70 A.3d 559, 580
(N.J. 2013), ajf'g 38 A.3d 620 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
68
In 2014, the court had granted COAH a final additional five months to adopt new
rules. See In re Adoption ofN.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous.,
106A.3d 1173, 1173 (N.J. 2014).
69
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous.
(Mount Laurel IV), 110 A.3d 31, 42-43 (N.J. 2015).
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judgments as to how these judges are faring in securing the goals of Mount
Laurel and the Fair Housing Act. 70
A comprehensive review of how the COAH operated or an
independent evaluation of the results achieved by the Fair Housing Act is
beyond the scope of this writing. 71 What can certainly be said, however, is
that four decades after the courts in Pennsylvania; New Jersey, and New
York signaled that they viewed "exclusionary zoning" by local
governments as a concern justifying a judicial remedy, that concern
remained vital only in New Jersey and, even there, observers disagreed on
what Mount Laurel and the subsequent Fair Housing Act had
accomplished. Some claimed that the Mount Laurel ruling and the Fair
Housing Act did little to combat residential racial segregation 72 or that
most of the beneficiaries have relatively higher socio-economic status, 73
while others argue that the results, while mixed, are largely positive. 74
It's also notable that the Mount Laurel approach to addressing
exclusionary zoning has not been particularly influential in other
jurisdictions. For example, in Britton v. Town of Chester, 75 the New

70

See, e.g., In re Declaratory Judgment Actions Filed by Various Municipalities, 141
A.3d 359, 380--81 (N.J. 2016) (reversing court order directing Special Regional Master to
include as part of fair share calculation a separate component for municipalities' fair share
obligation during period for which Council on Affordable Housing had failed to adopt rules
governing determination of housing obligation).
71
Orfield, supra note 27, at 909 (reviewed several studies of the effects of Mount
Laurel and the Fair Housing Act and found "[t]hese analyses find that its policies have
increased the amount of affordable housing. The housing has, however, disproportionately
benefited Whites and moderate-income persons rather than low-income persons, large
families, and people of color"); MOUNT LAUREL 11AT25: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA OF FAIR
SHARE HOUSING (Timothy N. Castano & Dale Sattin, eds., 2008); Alan Mallach, supra note
52, at 111, 115; David N. Kinsey, The Growth Share Approach to Mount Laurel Housing
Obligations: Origins, Highjacking, and Future, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 867 (2011); John
M. Payne, Housing Rights and Remedies: A "Legislative" History ofMount Laurel II, 14
SETON HALL L. REV. 889, 889 (1984).
72
See, e.g., Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel
Initiatives: An Analysis ofthe Characteristics ofApplicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1268, 1301--02 (1997) (finding little change in patterns ofresideI).tial segregation).
73
See, e.g., Span, supra note 37, at 68 (finding that while a much larger number of
affordable housing units have been realized via the New Jersey courts and the COAH, ttie
residents tend to have higher socio-economic status, "but at a low point in their lifetime
earning potential").
74
See, e.g., Mallach, supra note 52, at 114-15 (arguing that Mount Laurel and the Act
created greater affordable housing options for the state's lower-income residents).
75
595 A.2d 492, 497-98 (N.H. 1991); Brian Blaesser et al., Advocating Affordable
Housing in New Hampshire: The Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Planning
Association in Wayne Britton v. Town of Chester, 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 4
(continued)
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Hampshire Supreme Court relied on an interpretation of the state's zoning
statues to invalidate exclusionary practices, rather than an analysis based
on the Mount Laurel doctrine or the state constitution. 76
Several other New England states, such as Massachusetts 77 and Rhode
Island, 78 use a type of "housing appeals board" that provides "for a direct
appeal and override of local decisions that reject or restrict proposals for
low- or moderate-income housing." 79 Connecticut, however, uses a court
that can set aside local zoning decisions that receive federal or state
assistance. 80 Jllinois has also adopted this approach. 81 Some observers
conclude that these approaches have resulted in the creation of
significantly more affordable housing in exclusionary communities than

(1991); John M. Payne, From the Courts: E.xclusionary Zoning and the "Chester
Doctrine," 20 REAL EST. L.J. 366, 366--67 (1992).
76
While the approach adopted in the Chester decision was unanticipated, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court had previously considered several challenges to exclusionary
land use regulations, dating back to its 1978 decision in Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394
A.2d 847 (N.H. 1978), in which it had voiced its distaste for exclusionary zoning. In Beck,
the court warned municipalities that growth management must not be used as a pretext for
excluding non-residents who were members of a disadvantaged social or economic groups.
Id. at 850--51. Six years later, in Stoney-Brook Dev. Corp. v. Town of Fremont, 474 A.2d
561 (N.H. 1984), the court held that growth controls are properly used only when they
regulate and control development, and are invalid when used to prevent development. Id. at
563. Finally, in Soares v. Town of Atkinson, 512 A.2d 436 (N.H. 1986), appeal after
remand, 529 A.2d 867 (N .H. 1987), after a lower court relied on Beck and Mount laurel to
invalidate several exclusionary zoning practices, and the town both appealed and revised its
ordinance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court
which then upheld the revised ordinance.
.
77
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B §§ 20--23 (2016). See also Erika Barber, Note, Affordable

Housing in Massachusetts: How to Preserve the Promise of "40B" with lessons from
Rhode Island, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 125, 128-29 (2011); Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The
Impact and Evolution ofthe Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act:
Thirty Years of E.xperience with a State legislative Effort to Overcome E.xclusionary
Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REY. 381, 381-82 (2001).
78

Rhode Island Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, 53 R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 45-53
1-45-53-9 (West 2016). See also Barber, supra note 77, at 128-29.
79
AM. PLANNING Ass'N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES
FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE, 4-152 (Stuart Meck ed., 2002).
80
See generally Barber, supra note 77. See also Terry J. Tondro, Connecticut's

Affordable Housing Appeals Statute: After Ten Years of Hope, Why Only Middling
Results?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REY. 115, 152-53 (2001).
81
See Heidi L. Golz, Breaking into Affluent Chicago Suburbs: An Analysis of the
Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEY. L. 181, 181 (2006).
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would have been created without these laws, 82 while others are more
critical. 83 Still other jurisdictions use techniques such as "inclusionary
zoning" 84 or state mandates to adopt a local comprehensive plan that
includes a detailed housing element in an effort to address housing
affordability issues 85 and, thereby, seek to lessen racial segregation in
. 86
housmg.
While one might think that racial discrimination through exclusionary
zoning would easily be the basis for a federal court challenge based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution, two Supreme Court
decisions in the 1970s all but barred such claims. 87 First, in Warth v.
Seldin, decided the same year as Mount Laurel I and the New York and
Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning cases, the Court imposed stringent
standing requirements on exclusionary zoning plaintiffs asserting claims
based on the federal Constitution. 88 Two years later, in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court
required that exclusionary zoning plaintiffs prove that municipal officials
intended to engage in racial discrimination. 89
Warth required that exclusionary zoning plaintiffs cite "specific
concrete facts" to demonstrate both that they had been harmed by
82

See, e.g., Barber, supra note 77; Krefetz, supra note 77; Spencer M. Cowan, Anti
Snob Land Use Laws, Suburban Exclusion, and Housing Opportunity, 28 J. URB. AFF. 295,
296 (2006).
83
See, e.g., Jonathan Witten, Adult Supervision Required: The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts's Reckless Adventures with Affordable Housing and the Anti-Snob Zoning
Act, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 217, 252 (2008); Christopher Baker, Note, Housing in
Crisis-A Call to Reform Massachusetts's Affordable Housing Law, 32 B.C. ENYTL. AFF. L.
REV. 165, 205-06 (2005).
84
See Douglas R. Porter, The Promise and Practice oflnclusionary Zoning, in GROWTH
MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: Do THEY CONFLICT? 212 (Anthony Downs ed.,
2004); Nicholas Benson, Note, A Tale of Two Cities: Examining the Successes of
Jnclusionary Zoning Ordinances in Montgomery County, Maryland and Boulder, Colorado,
13 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 753, 754 (2010).
85
See CAL. Gov'T CODE§§ 65580-65589.8 (West 2000); William C. Baer, California's
Fair-Share Housing 1967-2004: The Planning Approach, 7 J. PLAN. HIST. 48, 50 (2008).
86
But see Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Jnclusionary"-Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv.
1167, 1207 (1981) (arguing that inclusionary zoning requirements can actually be
exclusionary devices under certain circumstances).
87
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
88
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). See also Robert G. Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair
Housing Cases, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 27 (1980).
89
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). See also Daniel R. Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and
Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1243
(1977); Robert G. Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond:
Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 961, 1034 (1977).
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exclusionary practices and that they would benefit from court
intervention. 90 To meet this standard, plaintiffs would have to point to the
exclusion of a specific project as having caused them injury and prove that
the court action they requested would remedy that injury. 91 Because this
task has proved particularly difficult for fair housing organizations-who,
unlike individual plaintiffs, have the skills and resources to bring
lawsuits-the Warth decision discouraged exclusionary zoning litigation. 92
Plaintiffs who could meet Warth 's standing requirements, such as
prospective developers of low-income housing, faced a second hurdle in
the federal courts. 93 While exclusionary zoning arguably violates the
Equal Protection Clause, an attack on exclusionary practices will likely fail
unless the plaintiff alleges racial discrimination and thereby subjects the
ordinance to heightened judicial scrutiny. But in Arlington Heights, the
Court ruled that a claim of racial discrimination requires proof that .a
municipality had the intent to discriminate based on race; proof that~a
zoning practice had a racially discriminatory effect was, by itself, not
sufficient, but could be used as evidence to prove there was a
discriminatory intent. 94
Exclusionary zoning plaintiffs faced a less daunting task if they sued
under the federal Fair Housing Act, because the Supreme Court had ruled
in Arlington Heights that such claims required only proof of a racially
discriminatory effect, not proof of intent. 95 When the Court remanded the
Arlington Heights case to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit for consideration of the plaintiff's Fair Housing Act claim,
the Seventh Circuit reintroduced the element of intent as one of four
factors in judging whether there was a violation of the Act and required
that any discriminatory effect be balanced against the justifications
asserted by the municipality. 96 But another approach soon emerged that
was far more favorable to advocates of affordable housing.
In Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after a detailed
90

Warth, 422 U.S. at 508.
Id. at 515.
92
See, e.g., Hope, Inc. v. Cty. of DuPage, III., 738 F.2d 797, 813-14 (7th Cir. 1984)
(finding that the organization representing its members had no standing due to a lack of
direct injury as exclusion from the project). See generally BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C.
WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION§§ 9.2-9.8 (Thomson Reuters2015).
93
See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
94
Id. See BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 92, at § 9. I 2.
95
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3617 (2016).
96
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977). See also BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 92, at§ 9. I 6 n. 75.
91
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examination of the intent issue, concluded that proof of a disproportionate
impact on minorities was sufficient by itself. 97 In 2015, the Supreme Court
affirmed the disparate impact approach to Fair Housing Act claims in
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., but cautioned that disparate impact liability
must be properly limited to give housing authorities and private developers
leeway to state and explain the valid interest served by their policies, and
that "[g]ovemmental or private policies are not contrary to the disparate
impact requirement unless they are 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers. '" 98 In light of this "limiting" language, and the stringent reading
of the statute by the four dissenting Justices, 99 some observers have
sounded a cautionary note about what effect Inclusive Communities will
. exc1·
· 10°
have "
m ad d
ressmg
us1onary zonmg.

V.

CONCLUSION

As noted at the beginning of this writing, the passage of eight decades
has had remarkably little effect on the patterns of racial segregation
Professor Roberts described in her Sullivan Lecture.
While the
97

844 F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1988). See also BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note
92, at§ 9.16; John M. Payne, From the Courts: A Federal Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning,
17 REALEST. L.J. 261 (1989).
98
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523-24 (2015) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971)). Circuit courts have applied the Inclusive Communities decision. See Ave. 6E
Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing district
court dismissal of disparate treatment claims under FHA and the Equal Protection Clause
on ground that the availability of similarly-priced and similarly-modeled housing in the
same quadrant of the City as the zoned property prevented plaintiff-developers from
showing a disparate impact); Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 611, 624
(2d Cir. 2016) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment against Garden City
on ground that City's decision to abandon R-M zoning in favor of R-T zoning was made
with knowing acquiescence to race-based public input, showing discriminatory intent as
well as disparate treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the FHA).
99
Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2533-34 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito's
dissent, joined by Chief Justfoe Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas, argued that the
language of the Fair Housing Act cannot be interpreted to support claims based on disparate
impact. Id.·
100
See, e.g., Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive
Communities: What's New and What's Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 115-22
(Sept. 18, 2015); but see Noah D. Zatz, The Many Meanings of "Because Of": A Comment
on Inclusive Communities Project, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 68 (Nov. 12, 2015) (arguing
that the dissenters are simply wrong and their interpretation of the statute will not stand in
the way of more robust development of disparate impact claims). For a doctrinal analysis
of what the Inclusive Communities decision portends for equal protection theory, see
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in
Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115 (2016).
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combination of public policies and private preferences that gave rise to
segregated housing, and the segregation they created, have abated
somewhat, the numerous sources referenced at the beginning of this
writing document the persistence of racial segregation in housing up to the
present. 101 Distressing as this is, still worse is the fact that efforts at both
the federal and state levels have had relatively little success at changing
these patterns.
The 41-year history of New Jersey's Mount Laurel doctrine illustrates
the difficulty faced in addressing the problem. When little had been
accomplished in the eight years following the Supreme Court of New
Jersey's landmark ruling in Mount Laurel I, the Court's Mount Laurel II
ruling, by allowing a "builder's remedy" and assigning exclusionary
zoning challenges to a hand-picked group of judges, effectively forced the
legislature to act. 102 The resulting Fair Housing Act, while controversial
from its inception due to its allowing for Regional Contribution
Agreements, established a workable administrative system for ensuring
that local governments met their "fair share" affordable housing
obligations. 103 Over time, however, the Council on Affordable Housing
(COAR), unable to surmount technical problems and facing political and
public opposition, proved incapable of meeting its obligations under the
Fair Housing Act. 104 Finally, in 2015, thirty years after the legislature had
replaced court supervision of municipal "fair share" obligations with the
COAR, the Court found it had no choice but to return the responsibility for
overseeing compliance with the Fair Housing Act to the judiciary. 105 And
this is the history of the jurisdiction uniformly acknowledged as having
done the most to address exclusionary housing policies.

See supra notes 5-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
103
See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
104
See supra notes 55, 62-70 and accompanying text.
ws See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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